Eric Kahler:
It is a truism that the progress of our rational and empirical knowledge is closely connected with the development of technology, industry, and of what we understand as democracy; that all these developments are but different aspects of one and the same process. What is not so commonly recognized is the fact that these thoroughly respectable achievements—science, technology, industry, democracy—were the very ones that inevitably brought about that ill-famed collectivism and are about to promote it even further.
One should cease to identify collectivism purely and simply with socialism and communism. All social and economic forms of our modern life tend equally to be collectivistic and to develop and foster collectivism. For all of them ultimately derive from rationalistic science and technology and their manifold implications. The roots of collectivism are to be found in rationalism and technology and not in any specific social or economic doctrine. A consistent individualist would have to advocate abolition of the whole apparatus of modern life, abolition of modern science, industry, technology—which would be equivalent to reversing the general trend of human life itself.
Let us briefly survey the rise of collectivism out of rationalism. Rationalism led to rationalization, both scientific and economic-technological. Rationalization means, among other things, classification and quantification, dissection of unique individual beings and phenomena into abstracted features and functions which they have in common, and which can be quantitatively manipulated. In this way, by means of theoretical devices (terms) and technical devices (machines), our physical world and, more recently, our psychic world are explored, mainly for the mastery and practical exploitation of nature. "Scientia non est individuorum." ("Science is not concerned with individuals.") To be sure, science, positivistic science, starts from the individual since, as mentioned before, the individual constitutes the only quite real, because immediately evident, datum. But science does not leave the concrete individual entity intact; science uses it to derive from it, or from a number of them, common properties, property abstractions, statistical laws, or laws of nature, thereby cutting up, dissecting the concrete and unique individual or phenomenon.
This proceeding necessarily leads to a thoroughly quantitative conception of reality. We all know that not only natural science but also the sciences dealing with human affairs, anxious as they are to prove themselves true sciences, exhibit an ever-growing tendency toward metrics — sociometrics, psychometrics, statistics, indexing, polling, testing, and so forth; in other words, toward extracting from the qualitatively unique individuals and phenomena those elements that lend themselves to quantitative methods of comprehension. We even notice an inclination to drive terminological abstraction so far as to contract, as much as possible, verbal language into mathematical symbols and formulas. There are sociologists who boast that their science will soon have arrived at a point where it will be able to dispense with individual thinking altogether because facts in combination with business machines will do the job by themselves.
This tendency is not confined to science proper; it is about to extend its sway over our entire life. The Kinsey Reports, for instance, attempt to pin down in abstract facts and figures the most delicate, the most personal, the most inexpressibly subtle relationship between human beings. In the spring of 1952 the American Physical Society, discussing a new mathematical theory of communication, seems to have reached the conclusion that, from the thermodynamic point of view, the writing, distribution and reading of books are never worth the energy that is put into them. Now with all the deepest respect for the science of physics, I venture to doubt whether the creative effort of writing a book and the chain-reaction of responses it may unleash in the reader—sometimes through one kindling spark and sometimes with far-reaching practical consequences—can be measured in thermodynamic terms. The problem may have an odd specific interest for the scientists concerned but, nevertheless, it shows the absurdity of applying concepts of one level to an entirely different level of existence.
The frequent denial of such difference on the part of scientists is the consequential issue. We can apparently measure almost everything today. We can measure the degree of laughter of an audience in response to a comedian. We can tell metrically whether a speaker is boring. And even the qualification for a public office seems to be amenable to quantification: "Judge Francis A.," so the Chicago Bar Association's report says, "is 49.63 percent of what a Superior Court judge should be." That after twenty-three years on the bench. On the same score card Judge Rudolph D., who has been on the bench seventeen years was rated at 52.78 and Judge William L., with twenty-four years' judicial experience, at 56.7. This is only an extreme example of the manifold applications of testing, indexing, and I. Q. scoring, all of which single out certain specifically required, collectively usable aptitudes from the whole of the unique personality, disregarding the fact that a person is more than just a bunch of functional properties and can make up by other qualities for the lack of the tested ones. Systematic research in its limitless expansion sets out to ascertain everything scientifically.
All scientification is collectivization—not only because it dissects the whole, unique personality and phenomenon into common fractional properties but because it invalidates and eventually atrophies the intuitive faculty, the personal common sense and taste of the individual who becomes afraid of using his own faculties. He does not trust himself any longer. Science is the supreme, impersonal, collective authority, and, if he feels any personal impulses rising against it, he suppresses them. What was known as human wisdom is on the wane.
Theoretical abstractions (strict terms, mathematical symbols, and formulae) correspond to practical abstractions, i.e., machines and gadgets. Conceptual abstractions are nothing else than theoretical machines used for the intellectual mastery of the world. Machines are nothing else than materialized, materially applied conceptual abstractions used for the purpose of manipulating and utilizing the physical world. This interrelation becomes most obvious at places where both procedures interlock: in the scientific apparatuses of our research institutes and observatories, in cyclotrons, synchrotrons, computing machines, electron microscopes, and so forth; and in enterprises where both purposes meet, like the Radio Corporation of America and the Rand Corporation. Technological processes, which are indefinitely reproducible, reflect scientific laws, which express infinite applicability.
Just as technology is penetrated with science, so, to the same degree, industry is penetrated with technology and with science directly. The result is economic rationalization which was also due to follow autonomously from the expansion of capitalistic enterprise: growth of organization means growth of rationalization. All these developments, the development of science, technology and industry, and their interpenetration, are but different aspects or ramifications of one evolutionary process; all of them lead eventually to collectivization and deindividualization. They split or invalidate the individual in various ways: apart from scientification, through specialization, junctionalization, standardization, anonymization. The chain reaction released by collectivizing rationalization, inherent in science, technology, and industry, starts with specialization. Specialization involves functionalization; functionalization brings about standardization—these are the three primary carriers of collective controls. And by means of these consecutive effects, rationalization paradoxically ends up depriving the individual of his rational faculty.
What does specialization do to the individual? It does not appeal to him as a whole, organic being, as a human being, as an individually unique being; it appeals to, it calls forth in him, some specific technical function, some functional qualification which he has in common with other people thus qualified. Such functions correspond exactly to the conceptual abstractions, general property abstractions, which science derives from concrete beings and phenomena. In fact, these abstractions may turn directly into functional beings: certain scientific specialists may actually be regarded as personalized functions. Specialization overemphasizes and over-develops this functional quality of the individual, singles it out while leaving other qualities and his essentially human qualities to atrophy since they are hardly required in his work any longer. Individuality, as we know, means indivisibility, something that cannot be divided. Now this is exactly what specialization does: it divides the man, it ranges that part of him which it calls forth into some abstract functional order, into the rank and file of some operational combine, into some category of occupational concern with all its paraphernalia: code of behavior, standards of opinion, lingo, and so forth. In this way, the concrete human particularity of the unique individual is displaced by the abstract particularity of the collectively specialized function. The collective, functional part of the personality grows at the expense of the individual and human part. The working day of the man is filled with his functionally limited occupation and all its implications of restrictive handling, interests, and attitudes. The problems of the dreariness of industrial work and the dehumanization and “alienation” attaching to it have been pondered by many people; for a long time, they have not concerned workers alone.
"The biggest trouble with industry," said John M. Caffrey, President of International Harvester Co., "is that it is full of human beings." The individual's need for self-determination, for selfhood, for the satisfaction of producing a whole piece of work and one that is worth producing, or for contributing to a task which he can comprehend in its entirety, with which he can identify himself, i.e., for doing meaningful work: nothing, not the best of conveniences, can fully replace this elementary satisfaction. The fundamental fact is that the workers serve a purpose which is alien to their own; they serve the purpose of a commercial collective.
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{Excerpted from The Tower and the Abyss: An Inquiry into the Transformation of the Individual, by Eric Kahler; originally published in 1957, reissued in 1989}
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